A  How To  of Nuclear Proliferation by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 4 Issue 3 Article 1 
1-23-1998 
A "How To" of Nuclear Proliferation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Other Political Science Commons, and the Other 
Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1998) "A "How To" of Nuclear Proliferation," International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 4 : Iss. 3 , 
Article 1. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol4/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
1 
 
Title: A "How To" of Nuclear Proliferation 
Author: Editor  
Volume: 4 
Issue: 3 
Date: 1998-01-23 
Keywords: Intelligence, Nuclear Proliferation  
 
Abstract. This article describes several political psychological approaches to best engage in nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
A nation-state may intentionally contribute to nuclear proliferation in order to (1) obtain funds for its 
treasury; (2) help fund its own nuclear weapons technology, acquisition and development, deployment, 
testing, and maintenance--all irrespective of treaties and agreements to the contrary; (3) help fund its 
scientific and technological base that can contribute to national security, educational, and economic 
infrastructures; (4) barter for desired products across the economic and military spectrums; (5) 
"sweeten" the relationship with another nation-state or other political entity; (6) increase its own 
credibility and salience on the international stage; (7) increase leverage in negotiating other political 
Issues; (8) increase the probability of some local, regional, or global military conflict and its threat 
consonant with the proliferator's political objectives; and (9) advance ever closer to some Armageddon 
compatible with internal psychological conflict, political ideology, or religious prophecy. However, since 
preventing nuclear proliferation is a public goal of virtually all nation-states--including most of those 
who engage in such proliferation--a proliferator is faced with diplomacy and intelligence challenges. 
Both challenges bear on how to best continue proliferation without experiencing significant negative 
consequences that overshadow proliferation's positive consequences described above. 
 
The intelligence challenge is to engage in proliferation without detection. With ever-improving technical 
intelligence means employed by supporters of nonproliferation, this challenge is very difficult--even 
though the (1) human intelligence means necessary to discern intent is often largely inadequate; (2) 
cover, camouflage, and deception operations can at times be quite effective; and (3) the exploitation of 
the human element in nuclear safety and security systems is at least possible--as is exploitation of 
aspects of physical, operations, and communications security. 
 
Luckily--for the proliferator--the diplomacy challenge is much easier to meet. This challenge is to engage 
other nation-state and political entities with words and acts as a cover for the proliferator's intelligence 
and counterintelligence shortfalls. What best constitutes this engagement? (1) The outright denying of 
proliferation activities may be quite credible among the largely unsophisticated on the international 
stage and within nation-states. This is especially the case if the world's premier purveyor of 
nonproliferation policy can be at least superficially tarred as a proliferation risk as (a) being the only 
entity to employ nuclear weapons, (b) continuing to admit the possession of large quantities of nuclear 
weapons and weapons infrastructure, (c) for many years advocating against underground nuclear test 
bans, and (d) recently advocating for the colocation of civilian and military nuclear applications within its 
own borders. (2) The proliferator can admit activities that have proliferation consequences. However, 
these activities are then claimed to be the responsibility of domestic renegades violating the public 
nonproliferation policy of the proliferator. (3) The proliferator can admit activities as in (2) above but 
ascribe responsibility to the recipient of materiel, technology, or knowledge. The usual story is that the 
recipient promised that all activities would only have peaceful consequences such as the production of 
industrial energy or basic research. Or the recipient is making the domestic renegades--or even the 
proliferator--an offer that can't be refused. (4) The proliferator admits to activities with proliferation 
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consequences and claims that it would sincerely like to curtail such activities. However, the international 
purveyors of nonproliferation are being so heavy-handed that compliance cannot occur without the 
proliferator looking like its sovereignty is being violated. Compliance, thus, would lead to exacerbation 
of nationalistic fervor and political destabilization. (5) The proliferator may be adept at pointing out 
examples wherein the purveyors of nonproliferation have "bent the rules" or even broken them. (See [1] 
above in this paragraph.) (6) The proliferator states it does not have the requisite ability to develop, 
implement, and monitor appropriate safety and security measures. (7) To increase the credibility of (1) 
to (6), the proliferator might occasionally expel a diplomat or representative or two from the recipient 
nation-state or political entitity. Sporadically, a contract may be discovered, cancelled, or held up. Or a 
seizure of nuclear materiel or nuclear trafficking network is very well-publicized. Much of the above 
relates to outright deception, some to a sad state of affairs. At times it is difficult to tell the difference. 
Often, leading nation-states in the nonproliferation arenas take actions or nonactions that ignore or 
exacerbate the problem. 
 
What can significantly stop the proliferator? Probably nothing--not even intelligence that the recipient 
may plan on employing nuclear weapons against the proliferator. This intelligence may merely be 
viewed as disinformation, as easily deterred by the proliferator's own nuclear assets, merely the "price 
of doing business" in an era of globalization, not salient enough in the pressing everyday life of 
bureaucratic politics and the domestic "power game," or otherwise discounted by magical thinking. 
 
A strong case can be made that the probability of nuclear weapons employment or its threat--terrorism 
or other variants of nuclear politics--is increasing, not decreasing, in the post-Cold War era. The 
psychological model of several discrete sources of threat and rules of engagement has been superceded 
by a field theory of ever-shifting suspects, assets, and modi operandi. (See Arkin, W.M. 
(November/December 1997). What's "new"? The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53(6); Erlanger, S. 
(January 16, 1998). Russia promises to stop companies from aiding Iran's missile program. The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Matlock, J. (February 5, 1998). Russia's leaking nukes. The New York 
Review of Books, 15-18; Mello, G. (May/June 1997). New bomb, no mission. The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 53(3); Philosophical Issues in verification of weapons limitation, reduction, and 
nonproliferation treaties. (October 3, 1997). IBPP, 3(10); (Supercomputer sales and nuclear proliferation: 
The surrealist top ten. (July 4, 1997). IBPP, 2(10); Weisman, J. (July/August 1997). Who's minding the 
store? The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53(4); When the "soft" sciences become hard: The safety of 
Canadian nuclear reactors. (December 5, 1997). IBPP, 3(18).)(Keywords: Intelligence, Nuclear 
Proliferation.) 
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